We show that the framework of Rule Learning can easily accommodate behavioral rules like aspiration-based experimentation, reciprocity-based cooperation, warm glow, and tit-for-tat.
Introduction.
In recent years, the field of learning in games has evolved considerably, with recent models able to make robust predictions in a variety of interesting games. Recent examples in the reinforcement learning arena include Roth and Erev (1995) , Erev and Roth (1998) , and Sarin and Vahid (1999) . In belief learning, Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Friedman (1997, 1998) provide some comprehensive reviews. In hybrid models, Camerer and Ho (1997 , 1999 have led the field. These models, though different in structure, are based on players adjusting, with noise and inertia, in the direction of the best-response to past observations. In that sense, players' sophistication is fairly limited. When hypotheses are permitted (in belief and hybrid models), players' hypotheses on others' frequencies of choice are limited to a weighted average of others' past frequencies. This is insufficient in capturing players' hypotheses and consequent behavior. In reality, players are far more sophisticated and are able to reason iteratively, as Nagel (1995) and Stahl (1996) have shown. Moreover, a large number of laboratory experiments have documented that individuals deviate systematically from the selfinterest model.
For example, in a coordination game, we sometimes observe experiment subjects tending towards an inferior equilibrium and then "miraculously" reversing direction and converging to the payoff-dominant equilibrium, as in figure 1. In the experimental session depicted in figure1, after three periods of going in the direction of the best response (action A), there was a surprising reversal in period 4, followed by the crossing to action B's basin in period 5 (best-response separatrix depicted by dashed line), and eventual convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This observed path appears to be incompatible with the popular learning models mentioned above. Binmore and Samuelson (1997) offered a theoretical explanation for such "separatrixcrossing" behavior based on aspirations and experimentation. They conjecture that the players begin with aspirations of payoffs, which during the first three periods depicted in Figure 1 are not fulfilled, inducing the players to "experiment" with other strategies. If experimentation leads to enough B (but not C) choices, then the separatrix can be crossed.
Another possible explanation of separatrix crossings is that some players make short-term sacrifices to "teach" others to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium (an interesting example of "teaching behavior" in repeated games is given in Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2000) .
We could think about these players as anticipating positive reciprocity from the other players. In general models of reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998) , a costly action by one party which is favorable to another is due to intentional actions by the other party perceived to be favorable (positive reciprocity). Similarly, an unfavorable action is chosen in response to intentional actions perceived to be unfavorable (negative reciprocity). Though these responses may be costly for the individual, they could serve to enforce social norms (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1998 , Fehr and Gächter 1998 , Brandts and Charness, 1999 which may ultimately result in everyone being better off.
The Rule Learning framework of Stahl (1996 Stahl ( , 1999 Stahl ( , 2000a henceforth S96, etc.) can easily accommodate aspiration-based and reciprocity-based as well as many other psychologically-based modes of behavior, from their appearance to their disappearance. For example, we can incorporate Binmore and Samuelson's insight into the Rule Learning framework by introducing an experimentation rule that is sensitive to the difference between player aspirations and actual payoffs. Players start with an initial aspiration level and an initial propensity toward experimentation (loosely some random deviation from myopic best-reply behavior), and if the actual payoffs fall short of the aspiration level, the propensity to experiment increases, and vice versa. Allowing the aspiration level to be updated gradually could then explain separatrix-crossing behavior.
We can incorporate anticipated reciprocity into the Rule Learning framework by introducing a cooperative rule (to choose the payoff dominant action), an initial propensity to cooperate, and an initial anticipation of reciprocity (the payoff that would be obtained if everyone cooperated). The anticipated reciprocity payoff would be updated only gradually, thereby representing patience to wait for others to reciprocate. Positive reciprocal behavior by others would increase the propensity to cooperative, but if others failed to reciprocate, eventually the propensity to cooperate would plummet.
In this paper, we formally model experimentation rules based on disappointed aspirations, and cooperative rules based on anticipated reciprocity. We examine the explanatory power of such models on data from repeated normal-form games with multiple equilibria like that shown in Figure 1 . Section 2 presents the basic Rule Learning model and Section 3 presents the four enhancements. Section 4 describes the experimental data we use to test the enhanced model -the experiment design, the games, and the rationale behind them. Section 3 plots the results and discusses the signs for aspiration-and reciprocity-based strategies. Section 4 presents the basic Rule Learning model and Section 5 presents the two enhancements. Section 5 confronts the enhanced Rule Learning model with the experimental data, and analyzes the contribution of these enhancements to explaining the data. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Rule Learning Framework.
The Game Environment.
Consider a finite, symmetric, two-player game G ≡ (N,A,U) in normal form, where N ≡ {1,2} is the set of players, A ≡ {1, ... , J} is the set of actions available to each player, and U is the J×J matrix of expected utility payoffs for the row player, and U', the transpose of U, is the payoff matrix for the column player. For notational convenience, let p 0 ≡ (1/J, ... , 1/J)' denote the uniform distribution over A.
We focus on single population situations in which each player is matched in every period with every other player; hence, the payoff relevant statistic for any given player is the probability distribution of the choices of the population, and this information is available to the players. To this end, p t will denote the empirical frequency of the all players' actions in period t. It is also convenient to define h t ≡ {p 0 ,...,p t-1 } as the history of all players' choices up to period t with the novelty that p 0 is substituted for the null history. Thus, the information available to a representative player at the beginning of period t is Ω t ≡ (G,h t ).
Behavioral Rules and the Rule Learning Dynamic.
A behavioral rule is a mapping from information Ω t to ∆(A), the set of probability measures on the actions A. For the purposes of presenting the abstract model, let ρ ∈ R denote a generic behavioral rule in a space of behavioral rules R; ρ(Ω t ) is the mixed strategy generated by
The second element in the model is a probability measure over the rules: ϕ(ρ,t) denotes the probability of using rule ρ in period t. Because of the non-negativity restriction on probability measures, it is more convenient to specify the learning dynamics in terms of a transformation of ϕ that is unrestricted in sign. To this end, we define w(ρ,t) as the logpropensity to use rule ρ in period t, such that
Given a space of behavioral rules R and probabilities ϕ, the induced probability distribution over actions for period t is
Computing this integral is the major computational burden of this model.
The third element of the model is the equation of motion. The Law of Effect states that rules which perform well are more likely to be used in the future. This law is captured by the following dynamic on log-propensities:
where g() is the reinforcement function for rule ρ conditional on information Ω t+1 = (G,h t+1 ), and β 0 ∈ (0,1] is an inertia parameter. We specify g(ρ,Ω t+1 ) as the rescaled expected utility that rule ρ would have generated in period t:
where β 1 > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Given a space of rules R and initial conditions w(ρ,1), the law of motion, eq(3), completely determines the behavior of the system for all t > 1. The remaining operational questions are (1) how to specify R, and (2) how to specify w(ρ,1).
An attractive feature of this general model is that it encompasses a wide variety of learning theories. For instance, to obtain replicator dynamics, we can simply let R be the set of J constant rules that always choose one unique action in A for all information states. Fictitious play and Cournot dynamics can be seen as very special cases in which R is a singleton rule which chooses a (possibly noisy) best-response to a belief that is a deterministic function of the history of play. Moreover, the general model can include these constant rules, best-response rules and other rules.
The Family of Evidence-Based Rules.
Our approach to specifying the space of rules is to specify a finite number of empirically relevant discrete rules that can be combined to span a much larger space of rules. In S96, S99
and S00a, the family of "evidence-based" rules was introduced as an extension of the StahlWilson (1995) [hereafter SW95] level-n rules. Evidence-based rules are derived from the notion that a player considers evidence for and against the available actions and tends to choose the action which has the most net favorable evidence based on the available information.
The first kind of evidence comes from a "null" model of the other players. The null model provides no reason for the other players to choose any particular strategy, so for the first period of play, by virtue of insufficient reason, the belief is that all strategies are equally likely.
The expected utility payoff to each available action given the null model is y 1 (Ω 1 ) ≡ Up 0 . We interpret y 1j as "evidence" in favor of action j stemming from the null model and no prior history. 
The expected utility payoff given this belief is y 1 (Ω 7 The third kind of evidence incorporates Nash equilibrium theory within the model.
Letting p NE denote a Nash equilibrium of G, y 3 ≡ Up NE provides yet another kind of evidence on the available actions. For games with multiple NE, the evidence for each NE is equally weighted.
1 So far we have defined three kinds of evidence: Y ≡ {y 1 ,...,y 3 }. The next step is to weigh this evidence and specify a probabilistic choice function. Let ν k ≥ 0 denote a scalar weight associated with evidence y k . We define the weighted evidence vector:
where ν ≡ (ν 1 , ..., ν 3 )'.
There are many ways to go from such a weighted evidence measure to a probabilistic choice function. We opt for the multinomial logit specification because of its computational advantages when it comes to empirical estimation. The implicit assumption is that the player assesses the weighted evidence with some error, and chooses the action which from his/her perspective has the greatest net favorable evidence. Hence, the probability of choosing action j
Note that, given the four-dimensional parameter vector (ν,θ), eq(7) defines a mapping from Ω t to ∆(A), and hence is a behavior rule as defined abstractly above. By putting zero weight on all but one rule, eq(7) defines an archetypal rule -one for each kind of evidence corresponding to the underlying model of other players. Eq(6) defines the space of rules spanned by these archetypal rules.
Next, we represent behavior that is random in the first period and "follows the herd" in subsequent periods. Following the herd does not mean exactly replicating the most recent past, but rather following the past with inertia as represented by q t (θ). Hence, eq(5) represents herd behavior as well as the beliefs of level-1 types.
Finally, we allow for uniform trembles by introducing the uniformly random rule. Thus, the base model consists of a four-dimensional space of evidence-based rules (ν,θ), a herd rule characterized by θ, and uniform trembles.
The Initial Propensity Distribution.
Letting δ h denote the initial probability of the herd rule, and letting ε denote the initial probability of the trembles, we set w(ρ herd ,1) = ln(δ h ), and w(ρ tremble ,1) = ln(ε). Then, the initial log-propensity function for the evidence-based rules is specified as
where ||(ν,θ)-( θ ν , )|| denotes the distance between rule (ν,θ) and the mean of the distribution ( θ ν , ), and A is determined by the requirement that eq(1) integrated over the space of evidencebased rules is exactly 1-δ h -ε. Hence, the initial propensity over the evidence-based rules is essentially a normal distribution with mean ( θ ν , ) and standard deviation σ.
Transference.
Since this theory is about rules that use information about the game as input, we should be able to predict behavior in a temporal sequence that involves a variety of games. For instance, suppose an experiment consists of one run with one game for T periods, followed by a second run with another game for T periods. How is what is learned about the rules during the first run transferred to the second run with the new game? A natural assumption would be that the log-propensities at the end of the first game are simply carried forward to the new game.
Another extreme assumption would be that the new game is perceived as a totally different situation so the log-propensities revert to their initial state. We opt for a convex combination:
where "T + " indicates the update after period T of the first run, and τ is the transference parameter. If τ = 0, there is no transference, so period T+1 has the same initial log-propensity as period 1; and if τ = 1, there is complete transference, so the first period of the second run has the log-propensity that would prevail if it were period T+1 of the first run (with no change of game).
This specification extends the model to any number of runs with different games without requiring additional parameters.
The Likelihood Function.
The theoretical model involves 10 parameters:
represent the mean of the participant's initial propensity w(ρ, 1) over the evidence-based rules, and σ is the standard deviation of that propensity; the next two parameters ) , ( ε δ h are the initial propensities of the herd and tremble rules respectively; β 0 and β 1 are the learning parameters of eq(3-4); and τ is the transference parameter in eq(9) for the initial propensity of the subsequent runs. The rule propensities and law of motion, given above, yield population choice probabilities:
Let t j n denote the number of participants who choose action j in period t. Then the log of the joint probability of the data conditional on β is
3. Enhancements to the Rule Learning Model 3.1. Aspiration-Based Experimentation.
The two components of an aspiration-based experimentation rule are the experimentation act and the aspiration level. We let p x (t) denote the probability distribution of the experimentation act in period t. Two obvious candidates for p x (t) are the uniform distribution p 0 for experimentation by random choice, and the recent past p(t-1) for experiment by imitation.
The third alternative we will consider is experimentation by random beliefs in which p x (t) is the proportion of the probability simplex for which each choice is the best response. Such choice probabilities would arise from beliefs that are uniformly distributed over the probability simplex.
Let a x (t) denote the aspiration level for period t. We assume an adaptive expectations dynamic for the aspiration level:
with initial condition a x (1). With 0 < θ 2 < 1, the aspiration level will adjust gradually to the actual expected utility that the experimentation act would have generated each period. If initial play is diverse and the experimentation act is diverse, then p x (t)'Up(t) will be highly correlated with the population average payoff. Hence, if the latter is much less than the initial aspiration level, then the aspiration level will gradually decline but remain above the population average payoff, and this positive difference could trigger an increase in experimentation. Conversely, if the population average payoff is higher than the initial aspiration level, then the propensity to experiment will decline ("don't rock the boat").
The Rule Learning framework can represent this dependence of the propensity to experiment on the aspiration level by using β 1 a x (t+1) as the reinforcement, g(ρ x ,Ω t+1 ), for the experimentation rule in eq(3). If initial aspirations are disappointed, then the log-propensity to experiment will increase, and vice versa. Further, if experimentation leads to higher payoffs, then experimentation will wane. Asymptotically, as long as θ 2 < 1, eq(12) has the property that the long-run propensity to use the experimentation act, p x (t), will depend on the actual expected payoff from that act, since initial aspirations are geometrically discounted.
In addition to specification of p x (t), we will need to specify an initial aspiration level In the class of symmetric normal-form games, we define the (symmetric) cooperative action as the action with the largest "diagonal" payoff, and we restrict attention to the subclass with a unique symmetric cooperative action. Let p c denote the degenerate probability distribution that puts unit mass on this cooperative action; we will refer to this as the cooperative rule, ρ c . But why would a rational player choose the cooperative rule?
A rational player who believes that almost everyone else will select the cooperative action would anticipate a payoff equal to the maximum diagonal payoff if he/she chooses the cooperative action. Then, if the cooperative action is a best-response to this belief (i.e. if it is a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium), the rational player will choose the cooperative action. If the cooperative action is not a best-reply to itself, a myopically rational player will not choose it, but a forward-looking rational player could still choose it if she/he believes that others will reciprocate leading to a higher payoff than the path that would follow from myopic best-replies.
If others do not cooperate at the start, the realized payoff to cooperation will be much less than , the largest diagonal payoff. This initial anticipated payoff is geometrically discounted over time, so provided θ 2 < 1, the anticipated payoff from cooperation will tend towards a geometrically weighted average of actual expected payoffs to cooperation. The larger θ 2 is, the slower the adjustment, so if the propensity to cooperative is positively correlated with a c (t), cooperative efforts could persist despite the lack of reciprocation.
The Rule Learning framework can represent this dependence of the propensity to cooperate on anticipated reciprocity by using β 1 a c (t+1) as the reinforcement, g(ρ c ,Ω t+1 ), for the cooperative rule in eq(3). When θ 2 = 0, we would have a stubborn, irrational cooperative rule, but otherwise, the propensity to cooperate will depend on the difference between the anticipated payoff and the actual expected payoffs of alternative rules. When cooperation is reciprocated, so its payoff stays high relative to alternative rules (which recommend different actions), then the propensity to cooperate will increase, and vice versa.
We further assume that the transference equation applies to the anticipated payoff, so 
Warm Glow
The cooperative rules of the anticipated reciprocity models assumed that the expected reward from cooperation was related to the actual expected utility payoff, but some studies have suggested that cooperative players act as if their payoff was higher for cooperative actions-a warm-glow effect (Arrow, 1975 , Sen, 1977 , and Collard, 1978 . Andreoni (1990) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) distinguish warm glow from altruism in that altruistic preferences imply that a subject's utility increases in others' monetary gains. Warm glow, on the other hand, implies that the cooperative act itself increases the individual's utility. Unlike altruism, warm glow should not be adversely affected by a large group size, and hence the mean matching protocol, while expected to diminish altruism, would have less of an effect on warm glow tendencies. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) found no significant role for altruism but a major role for warm glow in voluntary contribution experiments.
We investigate the warm glow effect in three ways. First, to the anticipated reciprocity model, we add a free non-negative parameter to the reinforcement function for cooperation.
Second, we add a parameter, multiplied by the diagonal payoffs, to the expected payoff in y 1 (Ω t ;θ) of the basic rule learning model thereby biasing the level-1 choice towards the cooperative equilibrium. Third, we ass a parameter to tilt the initial prior for evidence-based rules, q 0 (θ), toward the cooperative action.
A Tit-for-Tat Rule
Tit-for-tat (TFT) behavior gained prominence following Axelrod's (1981 Axelrod's ( , 1984 experimental Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments in which TFT emerged as the winning strategy, and Kreps, et. al.'s (1982) rational underpinning of TFT behavior in the finitely repeated rule specifies cooperation in the first period, and then mimicking the most recent strategy of one's opponent thereafter. The TFT rule we examine here begins cooperatively and thereafter cooperates if a threshold number of players have cooperated in the most recent period; otherwise it chooses a best reply to the recent period. Formally, let f c (t) denote the fraction of the population that cooperated in period t, and let c ∈ (0,1) denote the threshold. Then, we define the TFT probability of cooperating in period t+1 as
where γ ≥ 1 is a precision parameter to be estimated along with c. This probability has the property that (i) it is 0 when f c (t) = 0, (ii) it is 1 when f c (t) = 1, (iii) it is 0.5 when f c (t) = c, and (iv) it is S-shaped and monotonically increasing in f c (t). For large values of γ, the probability function is close to a step function at f c (t) = c. When c ≈ 0, the cooperative action is chosen for almost all realizations of f c (t), while when c ≈ 1, the non-cooperative best-reply action is chosen for almost all realizations of f c (t). To complete the rule learning model with this TFT rule, we specify the initial propensity to use the TFT rule as δ TFT .
The Experimental Data.
An experiment session consisted of 25 players playing two runs of 12 periods each. In the first run, a single 3×3 symmetric game was played for 12 periods, and in the second run, a different 3×3 symmetric game was played for 12 periods. We conducted 25 sessions, so altogether we have 625 different participants, all inexperienced upper division undergraduate or non-economics graduate students. Two sessions were conducted at Texas A&M University, and the rest were conducted at the University of Texas.
A "mean-matching" protocol was used. In each period, a participant's token payoff was determined by her choice and the percentage distribution of the choices of all other participants, p(t), as follows: The row of the payoff matrix corresponding to the participant's choice was multiplied by the vector of choice distribution of the other participants. Token payoffs were in probability units for a fixed prize of $2.00 per period of play. In other words, the token payoff for each period gave the percentage chance of winning $2 for that period. The lotteries that determined final monetary payoffs were conducted following the completion of both runs using dice. Specifically, a random number uniformly distributed on [00.0, 99.9] was generated by the throw of three ten-sided dice. A player won $2.00 if and only if his token payoff exceeded his generated dice number. Payment was made in cash immediately following each session.
Participants were seated at private computer terminals separated so that no participant We select 10 games (see Figure 2 ) from those investigated in Haruvy and Stahl (1999;  henceforth, HS99), with properties that make them ideal for a thorough study of learning dynamics. These are games 1, 4, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 of HS99. In addition, we have a 3×3 version of a 5×5 game used in S99, for which cooperative behavior seemed to persist (labeled game 21).
What makes these games ideal? We begin by noting that games 1, 4, 13, 14, 16, and 19 are characterized by multiple equilibria which are Pareto ranked. The selection principles of payoff dominance, risk dominance, and security do not all coincide in any of these six games, and no pair of principles coincides in all of these six games. Most importantly, the payoff dominant equilibrium action never coincides with the level-1 action of Wilson (1994, 1995) . This is important given the prediction by HS99 that level-1 is a heavy component in the determination of initial conditions. According to the predictions generated by the HS99 model, initial conditions in these six games will generally fall in a basin of attraction (for popular models of adaptive dynamics) inconsistent with the payoff-dominant choice.
Games 1, 14, and 19 begin with initial conditions far from uniform and very little movement is observed thereafter, with the exception of one run of game 14, where a significant proportion of the group goes against their best response to cross the separatrix towards the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium. Game 13 has a long dynamic path from initial conditions to the final outcome. The final period outcomes of Game 16 are almost equally split between the two equilibria, although the initial conditions fall usually in the non-payoff-dominant basin, hence resulting in separatrix crossings. Game 18 was investigated because its theoretical dynamics involve a persistent cycle. Games 9 and 12 have only a mixed-strategy equilibrium, and hence potentially interesting dynamic paths.
We also investigate two additional versions of game 13 (with 20 added to each cell, and accepted significance levels. We, therefore, discard the hypothesis of a fixed initial aspiration level independent of the game payoffs.
The games used in each session are listed in Table 1 . Note that the range of payoffs for the games differs substantially from [20, 70] to [0, 100] . In HS99, we found support for the hypothesis that a single payoff rescaling parameter, β 1 , applies to a wide range of games provided the payoffs are first rescaled to [0, 100] . On the current data set, we also found that the maximized LL increased with such rescaling. Therefore, in this paper we report only results obtained from rescaling to [0, 100] . This implies that all the versions of games 13 and 16 are "equivalent", an assumption that has been verified by independent analysis of the choice behavior across the different versions.
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In addition to the plot of the dynamic path for one of the sessions shown in Figure 1 , we also report the individual choice behavior for that data in Table 2 . The entire data set is available upon request from the authors. A cursory look at Table 2 suggests that participants, for the most part, do not persist in "cooperative" behavior (the action B in that game) unless others also simultaneously cooperative. For instance, although six participants chose B in period 1 (putting the initial play close to the separatrix), all but one abandoned cooperation in period 2, and none of the three who cooperated in period 2 continued to do so in period 3. Even in the critical period 4, of the five who chose B, only two persisted with B in period 5. While nine of the ten participants who cooperated in period 5 continued to cooperate in period 6, by then B was the myopic best-response. Similar patterns can be observed throughout the data. Hence, an ocular analysis of the data favors the experimentation explanation over the anticipated reciprocity explanation. We will rigorously test this and other hypotheses in the next section.
Maximum Likelihood Results.

The Basic Rule Learning Model.
We estimated the 10 parameters of the basic rule learning model using all the data from the 25 sessions. We pool over games in order to try to identify regular features of learning dynamics that are general and not game-specific, so we can be more confident that these features will be important in predicting out-of-sample behavior. The ML parameter estimates are given in Table 3 , and the maximized LL is -8550.21.
There are similarities and differences between these parameter estimates and those for a different data set (predominantly 5×5 games) reported in S00b. First, as in S00b, we find β 0 = 1, so past propensity differences between rules persist unless affected by performance. 3 The initial propensities for herd behavior (δ h ) and trembles (ε), and hence the total propensity to use some evidence-based rule are similar. Also the standard deviation of the initial distribution over evidence-based rules, σ, is similar, but the mean ( θ ν , ) is notably different. 2 ν is zero, and 1 ν is less (but still large enough to put substantial probability of the best-response to the level-1 belief). However, 3 ν is still precisely zero. θ is much higher, implying that beliefs adjust quicker, while the rescaling parameter for the reinforcement function shrinks 38%. However, the most substantial difference is the transference parameter which was estimated to be 1 in S00b, but only 0.308 here.
Despite these differences, the contribution of Rule Learning is robust. Restricting β 0 = 1 and β 1 = 0 yields a model with diverse rules but no rule learning. The maximized LL decreases to -8569.93. Since the transference parameter (τ) no longer plays a role, the likelihood-ratio test has 3 degrees of freedom, and the hypothesis of no-rule-learning has a p-value of less than 3×10 -9 .
Aspiration-Based Experimentation Results.
We investigated three versions of experimentation rules: (1) uniformly random choice,
(2) imitation of the recent population distribution, and (3) uniformly random beliefs. The parameter estimates and maximized LL for each version are given in Table 4 . In terms of LL, experimentation by imitation has the lowest LL (-8549.69; a statistically insignificant improvement of only 0.52). This poor performance is due to the fact that the basic rule learning model already includes imitation via the herd rules. We also find that the estimates for (δ h , δ x , ε)
for the imitation version are quite different from any other version, which is attributable to multicolinearity between the imitation rule and the herd rules.
Experimentation by uniformly random choice shows a LL gain of 3.38; with two degrees of freedom this gain has a p-value of 0.034, which is not impressive considering there are 50 runs. Moreover, the (δ x ε) estimates are quite different from the basic rule learning model, which is probably attributable to the multi-colinearity between random-choice experimentation and the tremble rule in the basic rule-learning model.
The largest gain is LL is for experimentation by random beliefs. This gain of 5.51 has a p-value of 0.004, and so is statistically significant. To gauge the behavioral significance of aspiration-based experimentation, we compare the random belief version with a nested model that has a choice rule derived from random beliefs but no dependence on aspirations.
Specifically, by setting θ 2 = 0, the initial aspiration level is fully discounted so the experimentation act, p x (t), is reinforced by its actual expected payoff to the most recent population choices -like all other behavioral rules in the model. The results for this model are given in the fifth column of Table 4 . The maximized LL decreases by only 1.10, and hence is not statistically significant at any common acceptance level. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that experimentation by random beliefs does not depend on aspirations in this data set, but rather there is support for a simple experimentation-by-random-belief rule (3.3%) that is reinforced like any other behavioral rule. Since none of the other versions of aspiration-based experimentation does substantially better, we conclude more generally that aspirations play essentially no role in this data set. Table 5 gives the parameter estimates and maximized LL for the anticipated reciprocity model. We note that the estimate of the patience parameter, θ 2 , is zero, indicating that players immediately react to the payoff from the cooperative action rather than reinforcing cooperative propensities by anticipated future reciprocity. The individual choice behavior (e.g. Table 2 ) is consistent with this finding. On the other hand, the estimated initial propensity to cooperate (δ c ) is about 3.7%, and statistically different from 0 (p-value < 10 -13 ). Therefore, we can strongly reject the hypothesis that there is no cooperative behavior in this data set (i.e. δ c = 0). Another curious finding is that the transference estimate increases to 0.888.
Reciprocity-Based Cooperation.
Because it is irrational to anticipate reciprocity in the last period of an experiment, we considered alternative versions of anticipated reciprocity that eliminated the cooperative rule for the last period 4 , but the results for these versions were essentially the same.
Warm-Glow Effects.
Recall that in section 3.3, three warm glow models were proposed. First, in the anticipated reciprocity model, we introduced a free non-negative parameter, WG, which was added to the reinforcement function for cooperation. The estimate of WG was 7.835, which is substantial relative to the payoff differences in the games. However, the maximized LL increased by only 0.54, which is not statistically significant by any standard.
Second, we introduced a WG parameter to the basic rule learning model adding WG times the diagonal payoffs to the expected payoff to y 1 (Ω t ;θ), thereby biasing the level-1 choice towards the cooperative equilibrium, but we found no significant improvement. Finally, we used the WG parameter to bias the initial prior for evidence-based rules, q 0 (θ), toward the cooperative action, but again we found no significant improvement.
The Tit-for-Tat Rule.
Estimating the TFT model, we found a maximized LL value of -8530.01, which is a substantial gain from the basic rule learning model, but still less than rule learning with a pure cooperative rule. Furthermore, the estimates for the TFT parameters are (c, γ, δ TFT ) = (0.04, 5.03, 0.047) respectively. Given these parameters, ψ(t+1;f c (t),c) is a sharp "step function" at 0.04, implying that as long as one person out of 25 in the population chose the cooperative action in the period t, the TFT rule will cooperate in period t+1. This behavior is not much different from unconditional cooperation.
Since our specification of ψ(t+1;f c (t),c) with c > 0 excludes pure cooperation, we decided to test another specification that would admit pure cooperation. This was accomplished simply by letting c take on negative values: c ∈ [-0.01,1). Not surprising, the maximum LL was achieved for parameter values that mimicked a pure cooperation rule. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the TFT rule adds nothing to explaining the data over a pure cooperation rule.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated how the framework of Rule Learning can accommodate behavioral rules like aspiration-based experimentation and reciprocity-based cooperation. In the data set considered consisting of 50 runs of 12 periods each involving 625 subjects, we found no evidence of aspiration-based experimentation or reciprocity-based cooperation. We did, however, find weak evidence for a simple experimentation by random belief rule that is also reinforced by its actual expected payoff like all other rules in the Rule Learning model. On the other hand, we found no evidence for warm glow effects within the evidence-based rules, nor for a tit-for-tat rule.
However, our conclusions regarding a simple cooperation rule must be softened. While the maximized LL dramatically increases with the addition of a simple cooperation rule, this gain comes largely by moving the mean prediction for the first period of Game 16 closer to the separatrix, so random fluctuations around the mean give initial conditions on both sides of the separatrix, which lead to final outcomes being a fairly even split between the two equilibria.
However, simulated paths rarely exhibit the reversal and separatrix crossing pattern (like Figure   1 ) seen in the data. Since the leading theoretical explanations of such behavior (aspiration-based experimentation and anticipated reciprocity) fail to be significant on this data set, we have a behavioral pattern without an adequate explanation. 
